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In 2006, a new Human Rights Council came into existence, replacing the form er 
Commission on Human Rights with a restructured intergovernmental body fo r  the 
global promotion o f  human rights and fundamental freedoms. Heralded as a turning 
point fo r  human rights within the UN system, it was hoped that the new 47-member 
Council would operate with a renewed emphasis on fairness and objectivity, although 
it must always be remembered that the Council remains a political body governed by 
and directed by states. As a member o f  the Council from  2006-2009, Canada became 
known as the lead voice o f  opposition, voting against what it viewed as unbalanced 
resolutions censuring Israel and the adoption o f  a long-awaited United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights o f  Indigenous Peoples. Canada also voted on principle 
and with the support o f  its usual allies against a variety o f  resolutions reflecting an 
agenda embraced by Asian, African and Islamic states, who can use their Council vote 
allocations to serve their own political goals at the expense o f  achieving consensus. 
More worrisome, however, fo r  the general health o f  the fie ld  o f  international human 
rights law is the seemingly unbridgeable gap between developed and developing states 
concerning the recognition o f  so-called “third generation ” human rights, including 
collective human rights with an economic dimension, that is revealed by this review 
o f  the Council s resolution and decision-making activities from  2006-2009, focusing  
on those actions which were decided by a recorded vote. While the divisions between 
rich and poor, and North vs. South, clearly pre-date the Council s establishment, their 
continuation and impact within a new institution dedicated to renewed cooperation 
reveals a degree o f  dysfunction worthy offurther discussion during the Council’s first
review scheduled to take place in 2011.
INTRODUCTION
For those following developments within the field of human rights law and 
policy, 2006 was an important year since it marked the replacement of what had become
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the widely discredited United Nations (UN) Commission on Human Rights with a new 
and reinvigorated intergovernmental body. Heralded as a turning point for human 
rights within the UN system, the creation of the new UN Human Rights Council was 
greeted with high expectations and the hope that future efforts to foster global action on 
matters of basic rights and freedoms would be guided by considerations of fairness and 
objectivity. Eager to play a part within this new institution, Canada successfully ran 
for membership, and served as one of the Council’s 47 member-states from its earliest 
days of operation in 2006, until June 2009. However, Canada soon became known 
as the voice of opposition within the new Council, registering a recorded “no” vote 
on contentious matters with a degree of frequency unequalled by any other Council 
member-state within the institution’s first three years, and establishing a hitherto 
unexpected reputation within international circles as a voice of dissent. With Canada 
having now completed its term of membership on the Council, a timely opportunity 
presents itself for review and reflection on both Canada’s experience and the general 
trends established during the Council’s formative years. This assessment is also useful 
in light of the Council’s first review to be conducted in 2011.
The purpose of this article is to lay a foundation for the 2011 appraisal of 
the Council’s promised benefits as well as it’s apparent burdens through an objective 
study o f what has happened within the Council from 2006-2009 based on a careful 
review of the official record. This article also endeavors to undertake the analysis 
required to understand more fully the motivating factors behind Canada’s position 
as the persistent dissenter within the Council. While others may wish to conduct an 
assessment of the Council’s contributions through a particular analytical perspective, 
or by focusing on a specific theme within the field of human rights,2 the aim of this 
research will be to provide a more foundational and equally valid contribution to the 
existing literature on institutional design and international human rights promotion by 
conducting a baseline review of the Council’s decision-making activities focusing on 
the adoption of resolutions and decisions3 by way of a recorded vote. Actions taken 
by way of a recorded vote, rather than by consensus, have significance since recorded 
votes only take place upon request and with the intention of creating a public record 
of positions taken. As a result, this review will rely upon, and be guided by, the 
consideration of primary sources generated by the Council itself, focusing in particular
2 See, for example, Philip Alston et al, “The Competence of the UN Human Rights Council 
and its Special Procedures in Relation to Armed Conflict: Extrajudicial Executions in the 
‘War on Terror’” (2008) 18:1 Eur. J. Int’l L. 183.
3 A “resolution” is the formal expression of the opinion or will of a United Nations organ, while 
the term “decision” is used to designate formal actions, other than resolutions, dealing with 
less substantive or routine matters. Actions are taken within the Human Rights Council using 
one of three vehicles: resolutions, decisions, and the self-explanatory President’s Statements.
on the Council’s reports to the main deliberative body within the UN, the UN General 
Assembly, as these reports serve as the official record of the Council’s activities.4
Consideration will also be given to the voting record for each resolution 
and decision adopted by the Council from 2006-2009, and to any relevant historical 
antecedents, with a view to determining the key areas of controversy affecting the 
Council’s organizational development and policy contribution potential. Although 
often overlooked, including by lawyers when citing UN resolutions in submissions 
before Canadian courts, voting records are themselves significant,5 especially within 
the field of human rights where the resort to the act of voting may be viewed as revealing 
a weakness with the alleged fundamentality of the particular rights in issue. Moreover, 
the adoption of resolutions and decisions by consensus, and thus by definition without 
the need to call or record a vote, is thought to add both moral and political weight to 
the specific terms of an adopted text, while also bolstering arguments to the effect that 
a mutually-agreed international minimum standard has now emerged from which no 
state should depart. Resolutions adopted by consensus can also serve as powerful 
starting points to guide the multilateral negotiation of new legally-binding treaties on 
matters of human rights, especially when a resolution is used to signify the attainment 
of an international consensus with respect to a declaratory text of general principles
4 The Council’s annual reports are published as Supplement No. 53 of the annual General 
Assembly Official Records (GAOR) and are thus coded with the UN document numbers 
A/61/53, A/62/53 and A/63/53 (with A indicating Assembly, the second number indicating 
the applicable annual session, and 53 indicating the supplement.) Copies of UN documents 
can be located by their document symbols and numbers from the Official Document System 
of the United Nations, online at: <http://documents.un.org>. Copies of the Council’s reports 
are also made available by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
online at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/>.
5 Hence why American law, by statute, requires the U.S. State Department to submit a detailed 
annual report to Congress on voting practices at the United Nations: see Public Law 101-246, 
§406. These reports are also made available for public viewing, online at: <http://www.state. 
gov/p/io/rls/rpt/index.htm>.
and future aspirations.6 Votes, therefore, do matter. Why else have votes, and an 
analysis of the voting record for the resolutions and decisions that were not adopted by 
consensus, given the observer a better sense of the key controversies existing within 
the particular international organ under discussion?
To assist with the examination of the Council’s development in its earliest 
years, this review of the Council’s decision-making activities for 2006-2009 is 
organized into five parts, beginning with an account of the Council’s creation in 2006 
and its subsequent refinement in 2007, before embarking on a detailed review of the 
Council’s substantive activities. Part I provides an overview of the Council’s creation 
in June 2006 and its legal mandate, while Part II explains the geopolitical realities of 
the Council’s structure and the distribution of votes. Part III focuses on the agreement 
brokered in June 2007 to finalize the Council’s functions, while Part IV provides a 
chronological review of the Council’s substantive activities for 2006-2009, focusing 
on actions taken by way of a recorded vote. As will be discussed, division within 
the Council was evident from its very beginning, with a vote being called soon after 
its creation on the adoption of a proposed text for a new declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples. Because this division among states continued from within the 
47-member Council through to the much larger 192-member UN General Assembly, 
the eventual adoption of a revised declaration text is discussed in Part V as well as 
the possible impact of the division on the declaration’s normative contributions. This 
article then concludes with a summation of the key areas of dissent and division 
within the new Human Rights Council, while also reminding observers that even an 
intergovernmental body dedicated to human rights promotion is at base a political
6 The practice of reaching consensus on the adoption of a general non-binding declaratory text 
before negotiating a more specific and legally-binding treaty began in the field of human 
rights with the adoption of the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, GA Res. 217A 
(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948), and then the subsequent 
adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47 (entered into force 23 March 1976) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976 No. 46 (entered into force 3 January 1976). Subsequent examples 
of this practice include the adoption of a Declaration on the Rights o f the Child, GA Res. 
1386 (XVI), UN GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 19-20, UN Doc. A/4354 (1959), and then, 
much later, the Convention on the Rights o f the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
3, Can. T.S. 1992 No. 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990); the adoption of a United 
Nations Declaration on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, GA Res. 
1904 (XVIII), UN GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15 at 35-37, UN Doc. A/5515 (1963), and 
then the International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, 
21 December 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, Can. T.S. 1970 No. 28 (entered into force 4 January 
1969); and the adoption of a Declaration on the Elimination o f Discrimination Against 
Women, GARes. 2263 (XXII), UN GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6176 (1967), 
and then, much later, the Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination 
against Women, 18 December 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, Can. T.S. 1982 No. 31, (entered into 
force 3 September 1981).
body, directed and controlled by states that share no obligation to pursue the same 
ideological goals and socio-political objectives.
I. THE CREATION AND MANDATE OF THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS 
COUNCIL
The Human Rights Council was created by the UN General Assembly through the 
adoption of a resolution on 15 March 2006,7 although the specific details of its functions 
and procedures were left open for further negotiation during the Council’s first year 
of operation. The resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 170 states in favour 
(including Canada), with Israel, the Marshall Islands, Palau and the United States 
voting against, and Belarus, Iran and Venezuela registering abstentions. According to 
the terms of the resolution, the Council was created to serve as an intergovernmental 
body responsible “for promoting universal respect for the protection of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind and in a fair 
and equal manner.”8 The Assembly further directed the Council to address situations 
of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, through 
the adoption of recommendations, and made the Council responsible for promoting 
effective coordination and mainstreaming of human rights within the UN system.9 The 
specific text of the resolution also required the Council to be guided in its work by the 
“principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive 
international dialogue and cooperation ...”10
As long-time observers of international human rights developments will 
recognize, this mandate for the new Council is virtually identical to that of the 
former, and now abolished,11 Commission on Human Rights as modified over the 
years. Despite its successes in standard-setting and the generation of new conceptual 
understandings of human rights,12 by 2006, the 60-year-old Commission had become a
7 Human Rights Council, GA Res. 60/251, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. Ill) at 
2-5, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251 (2006) [GARes. 60/251],
8 GA Res. 60/251, ibid. at para. 2, repeating verbatim 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 
60/1, UN GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. I) at 3-25, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1 (2005) [GA 
Res. 60/1],
9 GA Res. 60/251, ibid. at para. 3, repeating verbatim GA Res. 60/1, ibid. at para. 158.
10 GARes. 60/251, ibid. at para. 4.
11 Ibid., para. 1.
12 See generally Philip Alston, “The Commission on Human Rights” in Philip Alston, ed., 
The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992) at 126-210. See also, Howard Tolley, The U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987).
widely discredited body, much criticized for its double standards and selectivity,13 and 
whose membership at times allowed “the foxes to guard the henhouse”.14 Of course, 
there are contrary views, with Professor Marc Bossuyt of the University of Antwerp 
describing the politicization criticism as one:
based on a (widespread) misconception: the principal UN human rights 
organ is not a tribunal of impartial judges, not an academy of specialists 
in human rights, nor a club of human rights activists. It is a political organ 
composed of States represented by governments that as such reflect the 
political forces of the world as it is.15
Nevertheless, the text of the Assembly’s resolution clearly indicates a desire 
to strengthen and improve the human rights machinery of the UN by recognizing 
“the need to preserve and build on [the Commission’s] achievements and to redress 
its shortcomings.”16 As Professor Nico Schrijver of the University of Leiden has 
observed: “Institutionally it is the first time that a UN body has been dismantled and 
replaced in order to achieve greater effectiveness.”17
The Council’s creation also constitutes a key component of the larger project 
of UN reform that was endorsed by state representatives at the World Summit held in 
September 2005, albeit that the Council receives only a sparse four-paragraph mention 
in the World Summit Outcome Document.18 For some, the hope had been to create a
13 As explained by the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: “There is 
something fundamentally wrong with a system in which the question of the violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part of the world is answered only by 
reference to four states.” See Statement by Ms. Louise Arbour United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the closure o f the 61st session o f the Commission on 
Human Rights (22 April 2005), online at: <http://www.unhchr.ch/Huricane/Huricane.nsf/6 
0a520ce334aaa77802566100031b4bf/b0848560a2465272cl256feb0052a975?OpenDocum 
ent>.
14 The most notorious examples being the widely reported ousting of the United States in 2001, 
the election of Sudan in 2002 and the Libyan chairmanship in 2003. NGOs certainly viewed 
the questionable human rights records of Commission members as a central handicap: Nazila 
Ghanea, “From UN Commission on Human Rights to UN Human Rights Council: One Step 
Forwards or Two Steps Sideways?” (2006) 55 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 695 at 699. See also Philip 
Alston, “Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges Confronting the New UN 
Human Rights Council” (2006) 7 Melb. J. Int’l L. 185 at 191-2.
15 Marc Bossuyt, “The New Human Rights Council: A First Appraisal” (2006) 24:4 Neth. Q. 
Hum. Rts. 551 at 554.
16 GA Res. 60/251, supra note 6 at preamble, para. 8 [emphasis added].
17 Nico Schrijver, “The UN Human Rights Council: A New “Society of the Committed” or Just 
Old Wine in New Bottles?” (2007) 20 Leiden J. Int’l L. 809 at 822.
18 See further, GA Res. 60/1, supra note 7 at paras. 157-60. See also In Larger Freedom: 
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report o f the Secretary-General, 
UN Doc. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005), see especially paras. 140-47 and 181-83.
Human Rights “Council” with a standing comparable to other councils within the UN 
organization, such as the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the Security 
Council. In the lead-up to the 2005 World Summit, an independent “High Level Panel 
on Threats, Challenges and Change” had recommended:
upgrading the Commission to become a ‘Human Rights Council’ that is no 
longer subsidiary to the Economic and Social Council but a Charter body 
standing alongside it and the Security Council, and reflecting in the process 
the weight given to human rights, alongside security and economic issues, 
in the Preamble of the Charter.19
This proposal gained added momentum when then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Arman, the UN’s top civil servant, advised in March 2005 that:
... we need to restore the balance, with three Councils covering respectively,
(a) international peace and security, (b) economic and social issues, and (c) 
human rights, the promotion of which has been one of the purposes of the 
Organization from its beginnings but now clearly requires more effective 
operational structures. These Councils together should have the task of 
driving forward the agenda that emerges from summit and other conferences 
of Member States, and should be the global forms (sic) in which the issues 
of security, development and justice can be properly addressed. The first 
two Councils, of course, already exist but need to be strengthened. The 
third requires a far-reaching overhaul and upgrading of our existing human 
rights machinery.20
But to achieve such a change in legal terms requires an amendment to the 
UN’s constitutive treaty, the 1945 Charter o f  the United Nations,21 which in turn 
requires the agreement of all 192 UN member states. Pragmatism thus led to the
19 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report o f the High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change (Chair: Anand Panyarachun), UN Doc. A/59/565 (2 December 
2004) at para. 291.
20 In Larger Freedom, supra note 17 at para. 166. The proposal for a UN human rights body with 
council status is of long-standing with Sir Hersch Lauterpacht having made the suggestion 
soon after the Commission’s founding in 1946: see Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law 
and Human Rights (London: Stevens and Son, 1950) at 254. Canada’s John Humphrey, who 
served as the first Director of the Division of Human Rights within the UN, also backed such 
a proposal: see John Humphrey, Human Rights and the United Nations: A Great Adventure 
(Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1984) at 56.
21 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945 No. 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945) [UN Charter]. 
The text of the UN Charter is also available online at: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/ 
charter/>.
creation of the Council by resolution as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly,22 
albeit with an agreement “to review the status of the Council within five years.”23 
Paragraph 16 of the resolution further provides that “the Council shall [also] review 
its work and functioning five years after its establishment and report to the General 
Assembly,”24 with this review scheduled to take place in 2011.
In practical terms, or perhaps symbolic terms, the new Council has gained 
an elevation in institutional standing as a result of its more direct relationship with 
the Assembly, since the former Commission on Human Rights was one of nine 
commissions created by and reporting to the 54-member Economic and Social 
Council, which in turn reports to the Assembly. The new Council is also designed to 
meet more frequently than the former Commission, with a minimum of three sessions 
per year and additional special sessions,25 thus serving more like a standing body on 
human rights,26 able to address urgent situations as they arise, than a yearly convention 
or annual general meeting.27 In an attempt to address concerns of past politicization, 
the General Assembly has directed that all “members elected to the Council shall 
uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights” and 
Council members committing gross and systematic violations of human rights can 
have their membership suspended by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General 
Assembly.28 Admittedly, however, proposals for more specific, and more robust,
22 Article 7(1) of the UN Charter (ibid.) designates the Economic and Social Council, the 
Security Council, and the General Assembly as three of the six “principal organs” of the UN 
Organization, while article 7(2) expressly allows for the creation of additional “subsidiary 
organs”. Article 22 of the UN Charter further provides that: “The General Assembly may 
establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.”
23 GA Res. 60/251, supra note 6 at para. 1.
24 Ibid. at para. 16.
25 Paragraph 10 of GA Res. 60/251 (ibid.) provides “that the Council shall meet regularly 
throughout the year and schedule no fewer than three sessions per year, including a main 
session, for a total duration of no less than ten weeks, and shall be able to hold special 
sessions, when needed, at the request of a member of the Council with the support of one 
third of the membership of the Council.” Professor Bossuyt, who is also a former chairperson 
of the Commission, having served as a representative of Belgium, has described these 
provisions as “undoubtedly the most positive aspect of the reform”: Bossuyt, supra note 14 
at 551. Similar views have been expressed by the then UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Louise Arbour: see Louise Arbour, “A new dawn for UN and human rights” The 
Toronto Star (19 June 2006) A17.
26 As had been recommended by the UN Secretary-General in In Larger Freedom, supra note
17 at para. 183.
27 The Commission had met annually in Geneva for one hectic six-week session attended by 
over 3000 people, although it had gained the ability to hold emergency sessions since 1992.
28 GA Res. 60/251, supra note 6 at para. 9. These provisions provide a hook for advocacy 
efforts against certain states wanting to serve on the Council, and their existence may have 
contributed to Belarus’ failed bid for Council membership in May 2007, as well as Sri 
Lanka’s failed bid for re-election in May 2008.
criteria for membership have not received sufficient state support,29 and for some, the 
Council membership of China, Cuba and Saudi Arabia, alongside Canada, for 2006- 
2009, illustrates the weak nature of the Assembly’s exhortations. Nevertheless, while 
the potential exists for the Council to serve as nothing more than “old wine in new 
bottles,”30 the use of the “Council” label was intended to mark a break from the past 
and a desire to engage in a more constructive international dialogue on the promotion
and protection of human rights.
II. THE COUNCIL’S GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE
The Council consists of 47 states, elected to serve for three-year terms by a majority 
vote of the UN membership31 taking into account certain regional groupings of states 
in order to achieve the widely-held goal of “equitable geographic distribution.” 
This desire for geographic balance within the Council has resulted in the allocation 
of 13 seats each to the African and Asian states, six seats for the Eastern European 
states, eight seats for the Latin American and Caribbean states, and seven seats for 
the “Western European and Other States” group, which includes Canada, as well as 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States.32 Clearly, African and Asian states 
have the majority within the Council, holding 26 out of 47 states when they work 
together en bloc.
As has been noted by Professor Bossuyt, this re-distribution of seats 
weakens the position of the Western European and Others group (or “WEOG”), 
which previously held ten of the 53 seats on the former Commission,33 or 19% rather
29 On the membership criteria debate, see Philip Alston, “Richard Lillich Memorial Lecture: 
Promoting the Accountability of Members of the New UN Human Rights Council” (2005) 
15:1 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 49 and Alston (2006), supra note 13 at 188-204. See also, 
Explanation o f Vote by Ambassador John R. Bolton, U.S. Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, on the Human Rights Council Draft Resolution, in the General Assembly, 
March 15, 2006, online at the United States Mission to the United Nations: <http://www. 
usunnewyork.usmission.gOv/press_releases/20060315_051.html> and recorded in the 
official records at: UN GAOR, 60th Sess., 72dPlen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/60/PV.72 (15 March
2006) at 6-7.
30 See Schrijver, supra note 16.
31 Earlier proposals by the UN Secretary-General, and supported by the United States, had 
recommended election by a two-thirds majority vote: see In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report o f the Secretary-General: 
Addendum: Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/59/2005/Add.l (23 May 2005) at paras. 12 
and 15, and the U.S. explanation of vote recorded in UN GAOR, 60th Sess., 72d Plen. Mtg., 
UN Doc. A/60/PV.72 (15 March 2006) at 6-7.
32 GA Res. 60/251, supra note 6 at para. 7.
33 The size of the former Commission expanded over time, from 18 to 21 seats in 1962, 32 in 
1967, 43 in 1980, and 53 in 1992: Schrijver, supra note 16 at 812.
than 15% of the seats.34 As noted by Professor Schrijver,35 however, Western and 
Eastern European states are becoming increasingly close through their involvement 
in international organizations such as the Council of Europe and the European Union 
(EU), and together the two groups have thirteen seats, thus matching the allotment 
for the African and Asian states. However, actual experience within the Council has 
shown that two members of the Eastern European group are likely to vote with the 
African and Asian states on divisive matters, (these two states being Azerbaijan and 
the Russian Federation), while two members of the Asian group often vote with the 
remaining Eastern European and WEOG states (Japan and the Republic of Korea). 
When the African and Asian groups have the support of the Latin American states,36 
Western states can muster no more than thirteen votes on a Council with 47 members. 
Moreover, from a Canadian perspective, and with due respect to Professor Schrijver’s 
analysis, the increasing closeness of many European states does not necessarily assist 
the somewhat lonely “others” in WEOG, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
(known as “CANZ”), which face an uphill battle to change minds once a position is 
agreed upon within either the EU or wider European regional bloc. By their very 
nature, blocs reduce a state’s freedom to act in the interests of solidarity with the 
position of the group.
In any event, the election for members of the first Human Rights Council was 
held on 9 May 2006, with Canada winning one of the seven WEOG seats,37 and the 
United States declining to run. The other WEOG seats were held by member states 
of the European Union, plus one other European but non-EU state.38 In March 2009, 
the Obama Administration reversed the decision of the Bush Administration to shun
34 Bossuyt, supra note 14 at 552-3, fn. 10.
35 Schrijver, supra note 16 at 815-6.
36 To date the only Caribbean state to serve on the Council has been Cuba, despite its identification 
by the leading regional human rights organ within the Western Hemisphere as a state whose 
practices in the area of human rights deserve special attention and where “restrictions on 
political rights, freedom of expression and dissemination of ideas have created, over a period 
of decades, a situation of permanent and systematic violations of the fundamental rights of 
Cuban citizens, which is made notably worse by the lack of independence of the judiciary.” 
See Annual Report o f the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/ 
Ser.L/V/II. 134, Doc. 5, rev. 1 (25 February 2009) at paras. 149 and 160. No member states of 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have served on the Human Rights Council.
37 Canada completed its term of membership in 2009 and did not run for re-election. The 
pledges made by Canada in its bid for election in 2006 can be found in Permanent Mission 
of Canada to the United Nations, Diplomatic Note 0168, dated 10 April 2006, online at the 
United Nations: <http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/canada.pdf>.
38 The EU members were Finland (later replaced by Italy after one year due to the staggering 
of the Council’s initial terms), France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
The other non-EU member of the WEOG group during Canada’s period of membership 
was Switzerland, which is an associated country with the EU through several bilateral 
agreements.
the Council,39 and was successfully elected a Council member in May 2009, although 
the member states of the European Union continue to dominate the WEOG seats 
on the Council.40 Many states supported the U.S. bid for membership, presumably 
on the belief that there is a need to involve the world’s most powerful state for the 
Council to be effective. However, under the new rules no state can hold more than 
two consecutive terms on the Council,41 thus barring both permanent and presumptive 
membership for “great powers”, such as the five permanent members of the Security 
Council.
III. THE REFINEMENT OF THE COUNCIL’S MANDATE AND 
PROCEDURES
During its first year of operation, the Council was required by the General Assembly 
to “assume, review and, where necessary, improve and rationalize all mandates, 
mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights 
in order to maintain a system of special procedures, expert advice and a complaint 
procedure.”42 After a year of intense behind-the-scenes negotiations, a last-minute 
deal was finally reached on what was to be termed the “Institution-building package”43 
since it added certain refinements to the Council’s mandate. Faced with the expiry of 
the deadline, the President of the Human Rights Council announced that a deal had 
been reached by consensus, but he never provided the Council with the opportunity to 
vote directly on the package.44 However, this procedural maneuver did not ease the 
dissatisfaction felt by some states with the deal that had been reached, and the package
39 “U.S. to Run for Election to the UN Human Rights Council” State Department Press 
Release (31 March 2009), online at the US State Department: <http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ 
prs/ps/2009/03/121049.htm>. See also, Colum Lynch, “U.S. to join U.N. Human Rights 
Council, reversing Bush policy” The Washington Post (31 March 2009).
40 United Nations General Assembly Press Release, UN Doc. GA/10826 (12 May 2009), 
online at the United Nations: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0826.doc. 
htm>. The other non-EU state member, in addition to the United States, is now Norway 
(although Norway is an associated country with the EU through membership in the European 
Economic Area). No member of CANZ currently sits on the Human Rights Council, New 
Zealand having dropped its planned campaign for election in support of the U.S. bid.
41 GA Res. 60/251, supra note 6 at para. 7. See also Schrijver, supra note 16 at 816.
42 GA Res. 60/251, (ibid.) at para. 6.
43 Institution-building o f the United Nations Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council 
resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007, [HRC Res. 5/1] reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights 
Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53 at 48-73, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007). For further 
discussion, see Claire Callejon, “Developments at the Human Rights Council in 2007: A 
Reflection of its Ambivalence” (2008) 8:2 Hum. Rts L. Rev. 323.
44 As explained in Callejon, ibid. at 324, fh. 5.
became the focus of a divisive vote when forwarded to the General Assembly for 
endorsement.45
Although Israel and Canada chose not to make statements upon the holding 
of the final vote at the General Assembly, they had made their views known when 
the resolution to endorse the package was discussed within the Assembly’s Third 
Committee,46 and in Canada’s case, had also expressed its criticisms within the 
Canadian House of Commons when events first unfolded within the Council.47 At the 
Third Committee, Canada reiterated its disapproval of a package that singled out only 
one human rights situation in the world for permanent scrutiny, while eliminating the 
special procedures applicable to other countries of concern. Canada also stated that it 
“categorically rejected the manner in which the package had been pushed through at 
the fifth session [of the Council], when procedural maneuvering had taken precedence 
over the principles at stake, thereby doing a disservice to the Council and the causes 
it espoused.”48 Canada further stated for the record that: “Canada had been denied its 
sovereign right to call for a vote on the substance of the package in order to express 
formally its disagreement with its flawed, politicized elements. Not only had the 
Council flouted its own rules of procedure and those of the General Assembly, but 
also those of 60 years of United Nations established practice based on the equality of 
Member States.”49
At the final plenary meeting of the Assembly, representatives of the United 
States and Australia (the latter now led by the Labor Government of Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd) took the floor to question the contents of the deal that had been reached, 
with neither having served as members of the Human Rights Council. Both the United
45 See Report of the Human Rights Council, GA Res. 62/219, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. 
No. 49 (vol. I) at 434-435, UN Doc. A/RES/62/219 (2007) [GA Res. 62/219], adopted by 
a recorded vote of 150 to 7 (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, 
and the United States), with 1 abstention (Nauru). Note that the verb used in the resolution 
was changed from “Welcomes” to “Endorses” as the result of an amendment proposed by 
the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement, led by Cuba, adopted on the basis of a 
recorded vote when the resolution was discussed within the Assembly’s Third Committee: 
Report of the Human Rights Council: Report of the Third Committee, UN Doc. A/62/434 (3 
December 2007).
46 See UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Third Committee, 47th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.3/62/SR.47 (2007) at 
paras. 27-29 (Israel) and paras. 34-35 (Canada).
47 As explained by the Hon. Peter MacKay, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, when questioned in 
the House of Commons on why Canada did not agree with the institution-building package: 
“We cannot, for expedience, accept a permanent agenda item on the Palestinian territories, 
singling out one situation while at the same time eliminating a special human rights scrutiny 
of countries of concern, such as Cuba and Belarus. It is a contradiction” [with the Council’s 
founding principles]: HCDebates, vol. 141, no. 175 at 10900 (20 June 2007).
48 UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Third Committee, 47th Mtg., UN Doc. A/C.3/62/SR.47 (2007) at para. 
35.
49 Ibid.
States and Australia criticized the termination of past mandates focusing on the human 
rights situations in Belarus and Cuba,50 while at the same time, adding the situation in 
the occupied Palestinian territories as the only permanent item to be included on the 
Council’s agenda. Such a move, in their view, was in contravention of the Council’s 
founding principles of non-selectivity and objectivity.51 The United States also 
questioned the tactics that had been deployed at the Council to avoid a vote, noting 
that “if a Government had announced that the election would be held on a certain day 
and then told voters who showed up on the appointed day that the election had actually 
been held at midnight the night before, the world would rightly regard that election as 
unfree and unfair.”52 The Council’s institution-building package was then adopted by 
an overwhelming majority, with the recorded vote revealing 150 votes in favour and 7 
against (Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau and the United 
States), with 1 abstention (Nauru).
As a result, Canada, along with Australia, Israel and the United States, have 
disassociated themselves from the alleged “consensus” concerning the adoption 
of the Council’s institution-building package. Nevertheless, it remains within this 
package that one finds the main elements and details of the Council’s priorities and 
future work program, as well as its rules of procedure. These elements include the 
retention of almost all the “special procedures” that were developed within the former 
Commission on Human Rights involving the work of various “Special Rapporteurs” 
and working groups focusing on thematic issues or specific countries,53 as well as the 
continuance of the Commission’s past procedure for the receipt of complaints of gross
50 While many developing states want to drop country-specific mandates altogether, the 
discontinuation of the mandates for Belarus and China became the bargaining chip for a 
consensus package that maintained the mandates for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Haiti, Myanmar (Burma), North Korea, Somalia, and Sudan. A year later, however, the 
mandate for the Democratic Republic of the Congo was discontinued by the Council.
51 As recorded in UN GAOR, 62d Sess., 79thPlen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/62/PV.79 (2007) at 10-11. 
Academic observers have also noted that while the human rights situation in the occupied 
territories should be addressed, it is unfortunate that a specific agenda item be dedicated 
to it and not to other human rights situations: Callejon, supra note 42 at 337-8. For the 
Palestinians themselves, there may also be a downside to this separate agenda item as it 
makes their cause a political one and not a human rights one.
52 UN GAOR, 62d Sess., 79th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/62/PV.79 (2007) at 10.
53 HRC Res. 5/1, supra note 42, Annex, Part II, at paras. 39-64 and appendices I and II. For 
background discussion, see Jeroen Gutter, “Special Procedures and the Human Rights 
Council: Achievements and Challenges Ahead” (2007) 7: 1 Hum. Rts L. Rev. 93 and Hurst 
Hannum, “Reforming the Special Procedures and Mechanisms of the Commission on Human 
Rights” (2007) 7:1 Hum. Rts L. Rev. 73 at 74-82.
and systematic violations of human rights.54 The institution-building package also 
provides for the creation of a small “think tank” to be known as the “Human Rights 
Council Advisory Committee” to replace in effect the former Sub-commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights that had served as an active, and often 
bold, instigator of ideas and proposals within the former Commission.55 Lastly, the 
package contains the all-important content for the new “universal periodic review” 
(UPR) mechanism; the creation of which is viewed by many as the Council’s most 
innovative reform.56
Under the UPR, the human rights record of every UN member state will 
be reviewed and assessed every four years through a process of written reports and 
interstate dialogue, thus addressing the problem of selectivity that plagued the former 
Commission. Informed observers with an appreciation for history and the official 
record have already noted, however, that the former Commission had developed a 
similar “periodic reporting procedure” in the 1950s and 1960s, which was eventually 
abolished by 1981 because the reports it generated were considered to be of marginal 
utility.57 Nevertheless, there are those that believe that the new UPR mechanism 
within the Council will foster improvements at the national level of the state being 
reviewed58 while also serving as a means to carry out an impartial assessment of every 
state’s performance of its human rights obligations.59 It is also hoped that the new 
UPR mechanism will allow for the sharing of best practices among states, support
54 HRC Res. 5/1 (ibid.), Annex, Part IV, at paras. 85-109. Since 1967, the former Commission 
had examined information relevant to gross violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in specific country situations, and since 1970, had also examined communications 
received by the UN that appeared to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested 
violations. The latter became known as the confidential “1503 procedure”, so named after 
the Economic and Social Council resolution number by which it was created. See further, 
Nigel S. Rodley and David Weissbrodt, “United Nations Nontreaty Procedures for Dealing 
with Human Rights Violations” in Hurst Hannum, ed., Guide to International Human Rights 
Practice, 4th ed. (Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2004) at 65-74. See also, Alston, supra note 11 
at 145-55 (who views the 1503 procedure as deeply flawed) and Callejon, supra note 42 at 
332 (who notes that the procedure was of more use in the 1970s and 1980s when fewer states 
had ratified the treaty-based complaint procedures).
55 HRC Res. 5/1 (ibid.), Annex, Part III, at paras. 65-84.
56 For an assessment of the universal periodic review mechanism and a discussion of Canada’s 
recent experience, see Joanna Harrington, “Canada, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, and Universal Periodic Review” (2009) 18:2 Constitutional Forum (forthcoming).
57 See Bossuyt, supra note 14 at 553, fh. 12 and for a full discussion, see Alston (2006), supra 
note 13 at 207-13. See also Felice D. Gaer, “A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review 
and the UN Treaty Body System” (2007) 7:1 Hum. Rts L. Rev. 109 at 116-117.
58 This focus on human rights “on the ground” can be seen in HRC Res. 5/1, supra note 42, 
Annex, Part I, at para. 4(a).
59 HRC Res. 5/1 (ibid.), Annex, Part I, para. 4(b).
interstate cooperation in the promotion of human rights, and facilitate the provision of 
technical assistance by identifying states in need.60
IV. THE COUNCIL’S ACTIVITIES WITH RESPECT TO SUBSTANTIVE 
MATTERS
(A) The Council’s First Year
The new Human Rights Council convened its first session in June 2006, and soon faced 
its first setback when a proposed text for a long-desired “United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” failed to secure the Council’s unanimous 
approval,61 as is usually the case with the adoption of such texts in the field of human 
rights.62 The resolution concerning the draft Indigenous Rights Declaration was only 
the second resolution to be considered by the new Council, the first having concerned 
the promotion of a final text for an “International Convention for the Protection of all 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance,” which by contrast was readily adopted by 
the Council, and later the General Assembly, by consensus.63 Nevertheless, Canada 
felt compelled to deliver a statement of position before the Council to make public 
its views on the new convention;64 a practice Canada would follow for each of the
60 Ibid. at paras. 4(c)-(f).
61 Working group o f the Commission on Human Rights to elaborate a draft declaration in 
accordance with paragraph 5 o f the General Assembly resolution 49/214 o f 23 December 
1994, Human Rights Council resolution 1/2 of 29 June 2006, reprinted in Report o f the 
Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/61/53 (2006) at
18-27. This resolution was adopted by a recorded vote of 30 votes to 2 (Canada and the 
Russian Federation), with 12 abstentions. Canada’s explanation of vote can be found online 
at: <http://www.intemational.gc.ca/genev/new-nouveau/2006/20060629.aspx>. Further 
explanation of Canada’s position with respect to the version of the text promoted at the 
Human Rights Council can be found online at: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ap/ia/pubs/ddr/ 
ddr-eng.asp>.
62 See supra note 5.
63 International Convention for the Protection o f All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
Human Rights Council resolution 1/1 of 29 June 2006, reprinted in Report o f the Human 
Rights Council, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/61/53 (2006) at 3-17; 
International Convention for the Protection o f All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
GA Res. 61/177, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. 1) at 408-417, UN Doc. A/ 
RES/61/177 (2006). In keeping with the practice identified in note 5, the drafting of this 
treaty was preceded by the earlier adoption of a Declaration on the Protection o f All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, GARes. 47/133, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. 1) 
at 207-210, UN Doc. A/RES/47/133 (1992).
64 As recorded in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, 
UN Doc. A/61/53 (2006) at para. 66.
five substantive resolutions adopted by the Council during its very first session.65 It 
also appears that even at this early stage in the Council’s proceedings, Canada was 
feeling isolated with a review of the official record indicating that for three of the 
five resolutions, Canada was the only state that felt the need to put on record a public 
statement of position. However, it must be noted at the outset of this discussion 
that Canada’s desire to express certain views that were not held by those within the 
room may have been shared by other UN member states that were not part of the 
47-member Council. This is a fact often overlooked by media commentators and 
non-governmental organizations wanting to tout the Council as an authoritative body. 
Moreover, regional blocs, by their nature, can make non-bloc states, such as Canada, 
appear as outliers. It is also what makes Canada unique and a focal-point for this study, 
given the role played by bloc politics and the negotiations between groupings of states 
in determining the output of UN bodies.
It has been said by Professor Schrijver that “during its first year the Council 
faced more confrontations and politicization than even its discredited predecessor 
was used to experiencing in hot seasons,”66 and a review of the official record clearly 
supports this statement. Canada was also not left out of this debacle. In addition 
to its public statements of position concerning the Council’s first five resolutions, 
Canada also found itself voting against the texts of Council decisions 1/106 on the 
“Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories” and 1/107 
on “Incitement to racial and religious hatred and the promotion of tolerance”, the 
latter concerning what was termed “an increasing trend of defamation of religions.”67 
These texts had both been sponsored by Pakistan, on behalf of the member states of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a cross-regional bloc of 56 Muslim 
majority countries holding approximately 30% of the Council’s seats. Canada voted 
against the adoption of these texts “in good company,” to use the phrase used within 
diplomatic circles to refer to voting alongside one’s allies. Later, during the first two 
“special sessions” of the Council, held in July and August 2006 respectively, Canada, 
along with both Western and Eastern European states and Japan, felt compelled to vote 
against the adoption of resolution texts on the “Human rights situation in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory” and “the grave situation of human rights in Lebanon caused by 
Israeli military operations.”68 Canada and its allies took the view that these texts did
65 See Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. 
A/61/53 (2006) at para. 70 (concerning the proposed Indigenous Rights Declaration), at 
para. 79 (concerning a proposed individual complaints mechanism for economic, social 
and cultural rights), at para. 83 (concerning the right to development), and at para. 101 
(concerning the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action).
66 Schrijver, supra note 16 at 809-10.
67 See Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. 
A/61/53 (2006) at 38-39 and 62-63.
68 See Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. 
A/61/53 (2006) at 96-97 and 108-111 with reference to resolutions S-l/1 of 6 July 2006 and 
S-2/1 of 11 August 2006 respectively.
not go far enough to represent a constructive and balanced approach to the human 
rights situations with which they were concerned. The old days of politicization had 
returned, with a relentless focus on one particular human rights situation at a time 
when egregious human rights abuses were taking place elsewhere, including a major 
humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan.69
By November and December 2006, during which time the Council held its 
second and third regular sessions, as well as a third special session, Canada had become 
the first Council member to vote “no” in isolation, voting as the sole opposition voice to 
resolutions concerning the “Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan,” the “Israeli 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the 
occupied Syrian Golan,” and the “Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory: follow-up to Human Rights Council resolution S-l/1.”70 Canada also voted 
“no,” but “in good company,” against a fourth resolution concerning the situation 
in the occupied territories,71 and against two more decision texts. One decision text 
concerned the drafting of guidelines to address the human rights impact of economic 
reform and foreign debt repayment72 that had unbudgeted financial obligations,73 
while the other concerned the situation in Darfur but made no reference to ensuring
69 As former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was quoted as saying, “When you focus on 
the Palestinian issue, without even discussing Darfur and other issues, some wonder what is 
this council doing?”: Olivia Ward, “UN rights body off to a bad start” The Toronto Star (9 
December 2006) A20.
70 See Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. 
A/62/53 (2007) at 4-6,6-9 and 20 with reference to resolutions 2/3 and 2/4 of 27 November 
2006, and resolution 3/1 of 8 December 2006 respectively. Resolution 2/4 is especially 
noteworthy in that it was adopted by 45 votes to 1 (Canada), with 1 abstention (Cameroon).
71 Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military incursions in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including the recent one in northern Gaza and the assault on Beit 
Hanoun, Human Rights Council resolution S-3/1 of 15 November 2006, reprinted in Report 
o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) 
at 85-86, adopted by a vote of 32 to 8, with 6 abstentions.
72 Effects o f economic reform policies and foreign debt on the full enjoyment o f all human 
rights, Human Rights Council decision 2/109 of 27 November 2006, reprinted in Report o f 
the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 
15.
73 As acknowledged in Report to the General Assembly on the Second Session o f the Human 
Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/9 (22 March 2007) at 56, at para. 196 and at 65-66, annex 
II.
accountability for those responsible for the commission of mass atrocities.74 Canada 
also voted, in good company, against a resolution related to the negotiations then 
taking place concerning the Council’s future activities,75 as well as one resolution and 
one decision relating to the planned “Durban Review Conference” which aimed to 
encourage implementation of the controversial 2001 Durban Declaration on “racism, 
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.”76 Many states feared that 
the Durban Review Conference planned for 2009 would become another platform 
for attacks against Israel, with memories still fresh of the fervent anti-Israel and anti- 
American statements made at the first Durban conference in 2001 that had prompted 
then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the first black American foreign minister, to 
order his delegation to walk out. Canada was the first to announce it would boycott the 
Durban Review Conference, dubbed “Durban II” but held at the UN offices in Geneva, 
and was later joined by Australia, Israel, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Poland, and the United States.77
The first Durban conference in 2001 had also seen a revival of the old “Zionism 
equals racism” controversy within the UN -  a controversy dating back to at least 1975 
and the adoption of a General Assembly resolution on the “Elimination of racism and 
racial discrimination” which expressly “determin(ed) that Zionism is a form of racism 
and racial discrimination.”78 As one can imagine, this resolution was not adopted
74 Darfur, Human Rights Council decision 2/115 of 28 November 2006, reprinted in Report of 
the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) 
at 17-18. On the Canadian and EU attempt to amend this text, see Report to the General 
Assembly on the Second Session o f the Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/2/9 (22 
March 2007) at 61-62, paras. 243-248. By contrast, the decision to dispatch a High-Level 
Mission to assess the situation in Darfur was adopted at the Council’s fourth special session 
without a vote: Situation o f human rights in Darfur, Human Rights Council resolution S-4/1 
of 13 December 2006, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d 
Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 87.
75 Intergovernmental Working Group on the Review o f Mandates, Human Rights Council 
resolution 2/1 of 27 November 2006, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN 
GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 2-3.
76 See Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. 
A/62/53 (2007) at 20-2 and 25-6 with reference to resolution 3/2 and decision 3/103 
respectively, both adopted on 8 December 2006. See also Durban Declaration and Programme 
o f Action, adopted on 7 September 2001 by the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, UN Doc. A/CONF. 189/12 and Corr.l 
(2001).
77 Canada’s position gained justification when an anti-Semitic speech by Iranian President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad dominated the conference’s opening on 20 April 2009 and prompted 
a walkout by remaining European diplomats: Bruno Waterfield, “Iranian attack on Israel 
leads to UN walkout” The Daily Telegraph (21 April 2009) 16; “UN walkout as Iran leader 
calls Israel racist” The Times (London) (21 April 2009) n.p.
78 See Elimination o f all forms o f racial discrimination, GA Res. 3379 (XXX), UN GAOR, 
30th Sess., Supp. No. 34 at 83-84, UN Doc. A/10034 (1975) (quoting the unnumbered last 
paragraph).
by consensus, but by a divisive vote of 72 in favour, 35 against and 32 abstentions 
(illustrating the importance of checking voting records when citing the product of UN 
organs such as the UN General Assembly). It was also a “determination” that many 
had feared would cause the UN’s own self-destruction, as noted in a noted in a telegram 
sent at the time by the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to the U.S. Department of 
State, that has now been declassified.79 “Resolution 3379 (XXX)” (as it was widely 
known) remained on the books until 1991, and the adoption of another resolution to 
provide for its express revocation.80 The revocation resolution was also adopted by a 
divisive vote,81 notwithstanding the efforts of then U.S. President George H.W. Bush 
who had argued at the high-level segment of that year’s Assembly proceedings that 
“to equate Zionism with the intolerable sin of racism is to twist history and forget the 
terrible plight of Jews in World War II and, indeed, throughout history.”82
(B) Continuing the Trend of Division and the Key Areas of Controversy
The trend of division established during the Council’s inaugural sessions in 2006 has 
continued throughout the eleven regular sessions and eleven special sessions held by 
the Council during Canada’s term of membership. Although it must be noted that 
there were many resolutions and decisions adopted by consensus during this period, as 
well as draft texts that were tried and then abandoned, a review of the resolutions and 
decisions that were subjected to a recorded vote for their adoption reveals the Council’s 
key areas of controversy. This record also shows that Canada was the only state to 
vote “no” in isolation with some regularity, although some other states may have had 
some sympathy for Canada’s critique as signified by a vote of abstention.83 (The only 
other state to vote “no” in isolation during Canada’s term on the Council was South
79 See Document 82: Telegram 5150 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department 
o f State, October 18, 1975, 1818Z in Foreign Relations o f the United States, 1969-1976, 
Vol. E-14, Part 1, “Documents on the United Nations, 1973-1976” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2008), also made available by the Office of the Historian of 
the U.S. State Department online at: <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frusl969- 
76vel4pl/d82>.
80 See Elimination o f racism and racial discrimination, GA Res. 46/86, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., 
Supp. No. 49 (vol. 1) at 39, UN Doc. A/RES/46/86 (1991) [GA Res. 46/86].
81 GA Res. 46/86 (ibid.) was adopted by a vote of 111 to 25, with 13 abstentions. The texts of 
both resolutions, and their voting records, are reproduced together on the website of Israel’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs online at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/ 
Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1988-1992/260%20General%20 
Assembly%20Resolution%2046-86-%20Revocation>.
82 Address to the 46th Session o f the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, (23 
September 1991), made available by The American Presidency Project online at: <http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=20012>.
83 Commentators, including the Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, often overlook 
the presence of abstentions when drawing attention to a “no” vote by Canada, burying these 
details in footnotes without further analysis: see Standing Senate Committee on Human 
Rights, Canada and the United Nations Human Rights Council: A Time for Serious Re- 
Evaluation (Chair: Raynell Andreychuk) (June 2008) at 10, fn. 14 and 12, fn. 18.
Africa, which did so once during the tenth session.84) The twelve resolutions to which 
Canada gave an isolated “no” vote were all concerned with the human rights situation 
in the occupied territories in the Middle East, with the texts viewed by Canada as 
being unbalanced and solely focused on Israeli actions or inadequately acknowledging 
Israel’s security concerns.85 For many of these resolutions, Canada’s usual allies 
abstained, rather than registering a vote in favour or against, but for two of the twelve 
occasions, Canada’s “no” vote was cast in splendid isolation, with even the WEOG 
states voting in favour of what were presumably viewed by instructing capitals as 
balanced texts.86 In addition to the twelve resolutions mentioned above, and an earlier
84 See Discrimination based on religion or belief and its impact on the enjoyment o f economic, 
social and cultural rights, Human Rights Council resolution 10/25 of 27 March 2009, 
reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council at its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 
(20 April 2009) at 95-98, adopted by a vote of 22 (including Canada) to 1 (South Africa), 
with 24 abstentions.
85 In addition to Council resolutions 2/3, 2/4 and 3/1 mentioned above (see note 69), see 
Religious and cultural rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 
Human Rights Council resolution 6/19 of 28 September 2007, reprinted in Report o f the 
Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 
33-34; Human rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, Human Rights 
Council resolution S-6/1 of 24 January 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights 
Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 242-243; Human 
rights violations emanating from Israeli military attacks and incursions in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, particularly the recent ones in the occupied Gaza Strip, Human Rights 
Council resolution 7/1 of 6 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, 
UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 81-82; Israeli settlements 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian 
Golan, Human Rights Council resolution 7/18 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the 
Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 
123-126; Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan, Human Rights Council resolution 
7/30 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d 
Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 161-163; The grave violations o f human 
rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military 
attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip, Human Rights Council resolution S-9/1 of 12 
January 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Ninth Special Session, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/S-9/2 (27 February 2009) at 3-6; Human rights in the occupied Syrian 
Golan, Human Rights Council resolution 10/17 of 26 March 2009, reprinted in Report o f the 
Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 67- 
70; Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and 
in the occupied Syrian Golan, Human Rights Council resolution 10/18 of 26 March 2009, 
reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 
(20 April 2009) at 70-75; Follow-up to Council resolution S-9/1 on the grave violations o f  
human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli 
military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip, Human Rights Council resolution 10/21 of
26 March 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 79-80.
86 HRC Res. 7/18 and HRC Res. 10/18, supra note 84.
resolution adopted at the Council’s third special session,87 two more resolutions on the 
occupied territories in the Middle East (for a total of 15) were adopted by a recorded 
vote during Canada’s term of membership on the Council, but on these occasions, 
Canada’s “no” vote received some support from its usual allies. Specifically, Canada 
was joined by France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
the United Kingdom in voting against the adoption of Council resolution 9/18 in 
September 2008,88 and by Germany, Italy and Netherlands in voting against Council 
resolution 10/19 in March 2009.89
But putting aside the resolutions concerning Israel, a review of the official 
records of the Council’s activities for its first eleven sessions also reveals a persistent 
and continuing division among Council states that has been evident within various 
UN fora since decolonization produced a change in the voting weight of Asian and 
African states, and developing states in general.90 From 2006-2009, Canada and other 
wealthy and developed states were often pushed by the actions of poorer developing 
states to vote against resolutions that reflected a desire embraced by many developing 
countries to recognize and develop further so-called “third generation” human rights,91
87 See HRC Res. S-3/1, supra note 70 (with Canada joined by the Czech Republic, Finland, 
Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, and the United Kingdom in voting no).
88 See Follow-up to resolution S-3/1: human rights violations emanating from Israeli military 
incursions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the shelling o f Beit Hanoun, Human 
Rights Council resolution 9/18 of 24 September 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human 
Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, Addendum, UN Doc. A/63/53/Add.l 
(2008) at 46.
89 See Human rights violations emanating from the Israeli military attacks and operations in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Human Rights Council resolution 10/19 of 26 March 
2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. AI 
HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 75-77.
90 At the time of its creation in 1945, the UN consisted of 51 states, with mostly European 
and Latin American states playing a predominant role. Gradually, and over time, Asian and 
African states have assumed a more dominant position in an organization now consisting of 
192 states.
91 A concept popularized by the Czech-French international lawyer and former UNESCO 
legal adviser, Karel Vasak, who viewed third generation human rights as a response to the 
phenomenon of global interdependence, requiring states to work together, in solidarity, 
for the maintenance of peace, protection of the environment, and the encouragement of 
development: Karal Vasak, “A Thirty Year Struggle -  the Sustained Efforts to Give Force of 
Law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” UNESCO Courier (November 1977) at 
29, aptly summarized in Roland Rich, “The Right to Development: A Right of Peoples?” in 
James Crawford, ed., The Rights o f Peoples (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 39 at 
41. See also Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) at 24 and Philip Alston, “Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and 
Fall” in Philip Alston, ed., Peoples’ Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 259 at 
fn. 1 (who describes Karel Vasak as “the most persistent proponent of the concept of peoples’ 
rights”).
or what are termed “peoples’ rights,” including a peoples’ right to peace92 and a right 
to international solidarity.93 This push for recognition took place within the Council 
despite past difficulties in reaching consensus, and with respect to the seemingly 
paradoxical “right to peace,” a degree of past ambivalence.94 Developing states, 
however, viewed the recognition of such rights as part of a wider campaign to create a 
more equitable (in their view) international order,95 with the hope that this new order 
would also address such concerns as the special impact of globalization on developing 
countries96 and the human rights’ impact of foreign debt and other international
92 Promotion o f the right ofpeoples to peace, Human Rights Council resolution 8/9 of 18 June
2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, 
UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 205-208, adopted by a vote of 32 to 13 (including Canada), with
2 abstentions. See also Promotion o f the right o f peoples to peace, Human Rights Council 
resolution 11/4 of 17 June 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its 
Eleventh Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/37 (29 June 2009) at 20-24, adopted by a recorded 
vote of 32 to 13 (including Canada), with 1 abstention.
93 Human rights and international solidarity, Human Rights Council resolution 6/3 of 27 
September 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., 
Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 5-8, adopted by a vote 34 to 12, with 1 abstention. 
See also Mandate o f the independent expert on human rights and international solidarity, 
Human Rights Council resolution 7/5 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human 
Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 89-90, 
adopted by a vote 34 to 13, and Human Rights and Solidarity, Human Rights Council 
resolution 9/2 of 24 September 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN 
GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, Addendum, UN Doc. A/63/53/Add. 1 (2008) at 3-6, adopted 
by a vote 33 to 13. Canada voted against the adoption of all three resolutions.
94 The campaign to recognize a peoples’ right to peace culminated in the adoption of a 
Declaration on the Right o f Peoples to Peace, GA Res. 39/11, UN GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. 
No. 51 at 22, UN Doc. A/RES/39/11 (1984), but with 34 abstentions: Tomuschat, supra 
note 90 at 49. The promotion of a “right to peace” then became the pet project of UNESCO 
Director-General Federico Mayor in the late 1990s, without much success: Alston (2001), 
supra note 90 at 279-81. The issue was revived in 2002, with the adoption of Promotion o f 
the right o f peoples topeace, GARes. 57/216, UN GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. 1) at 
421 -422, UN Doc. A/RES/57/216 (2002), adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 53 (including 
Canada), with 14 abstentions.
95 See Promotion o f a democratic and equitable international order, Human Rights Council 
resolution 8/5 of 18 June 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 
63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 193-196, adopted by a vote of 33 to 13, 
with 1 abstention.
96 Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment o f all human rights, Human Rights 
Council resolution 4/5 of 30 March 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, 
UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 35-36, adopted by a vote of
34 to 13.
financial obligations.97 There remains, however, a fundamental difference of opinion 
among many states as to how, and whether, to address such issues through a human 
rights lens and thus for some, these matters are not viewed as appropriate subject 
matters for action within the Council.
There also remains a deeper conceptual division between many developed 
and developing states on the appropriateness of recognizing what may be called 
collective human rights, with many developed states expressing far more comfort with 
the traditional view of human rights as rights that we hold on an inherent basis as 
human beings. In this conception, human rights are for the benefit of individuals 
rather than collectivities. Of course, many developing states criticize international law 
for its Western bias, as revealed by this focus on the individual’s role in society, with 
African and Asian states placing more emphasis on the welfare of the family, tribe or 
clan. Nevertheless, while some individual rights and freedoms can be exercised with 
others, such as freedom of religion and association, and some human rights, such as 
minority rights, the right to respect for family life, and the prohibition on genocide,98 
clearly have a collective dimension, many developed states are concerned with the 
conceptualization of peoples’ rights as human rights given the lack of a precise or 
generally accepted definition of the collectivity or “people.” While it is true that 
African states have chosen, as a matter of their own free will, to recognize some 
third generation rights within their regional human rights regime,99 as explained in 
the writings of German international law professor Christian Tomuschat, “all human 
rights of the third generation are surrounded by deep-going uncertainties regarding 
their holders, their duty-bearers, and their substance.”100 For many observers, the 
difficulty in determining who holds a collective human right gives rise to a fear that 
the most plausible “person” to exercise a people’s human right will be the state, which 
in turn, leads to fears among developed states that the recognition of collective human
97 Mandate o f the independent expert on the effects o f foreign debt and other related 
international financial obligations o f States on the full enjoyment o f all human rights, 
particularly economic, social and cultural rights, Human Rights Council resolution 7/4 of 27 
March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. 
No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 86-88, adopted by a vote of 34 to 13 (including Canada); 
The effects offoreign debt and other related international financial obligations o f States on 
the full enjoyment o f all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, 
Human Rights Council resolution 11/5 of 17 June 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human 
Rights Council on its Eleventh Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/11/37 (2009) at 25-31, adopted by 
a vote of 31 to 13 (including Canada), with 2 abstentions.
98 Also encapsulated as a group’s right to physical existence: James Crawford, “The Rights of 
Peoples: ‘Peoples’ or ‘Governments’” in The Rights o f Peoples, supra note 90 at 57 and 59- 
60.
99 The African Charter o f Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217,
(1982) 21 1.L.M. 58 (entered into force 21 October 1986), recognizes a right to development 
(art. 22), a right to peace and security (art. 23), and a right to a “generally satisfactory 
environment” (art. 24).
100 Tomuschat, supra note 90 at 50.
rights will be used by some states to justify or excuse infringements of individual 
human rights for the benefit of state goals such as development.
Although the legal bureau of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade had expressed concern with the conceptualization of collective 
human rights in 1985 and allowed for this concern to be published,101 by 1989, 
Canada’s position on collective human rights, according to the legal bureau, was to 
recognize that “the existence and expansion of collective rights have gradually gained 
broader international acceptance.”102 The legal bureau further explained that it was 
Canada’s position that “[t]he specific rights emerging in this area have generally not 
posed difficulties for Canada,” although Canada also wanted such rights to be “as 
clearly defined as possible” and “not be elaborated as ‘prerequisites’ for the enjoyment 
of other human rights.”103 In this way, collective human rights, such as a right to 
development, should, in Canada’s view, be regarded as indivisible from other human 
rights and interdependent with them, and thus the “underdevelopment of a state should 
not be used as an excuse to justify abuses of human rights.”104 The legal bureau, 
however, also recognized that “care must be exercised in the discussion of newly 
emerging rights,” noting “that the focus remains centred on human rights and not 
on subjects such as toxic wastes and external debt, which are more appropriately 
addressed in other fora ...”105 It is telling that the essence of this sentence, written 
in 1989, explains the opposition of Canada and many of its allies, at least in part, to 
some of the resolutions adopted by the Human Rights Council almost 20 year 
Canada also continued to vote, in good company, against Council resolutions relating
101 Excerpt from a memorandum dated 9 September 1985, reprinted in Edward G. Lee, ed., 
“Canadian Practice in International Law during 1985 at the Department of External Affairs” 
[1986] 24 Can. Yrbk Int’l L. 386 at 389-390.
102 Excerpt from a document dated 22 March 1989, reprinted in Edward G. Lee, ed., “Canadian 
Practice in International Law at the Department of External Affairs in 1988-1989” [1989] 27 
Can. Yrbk Int’l L. 373 at 375-376.
103 Ibid. at 376.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
to the Durban review conference,106 (introduced by Egypt on behalf of the African 
group); the continuing “defamation” of religions (introduced by Pakistan on behalf 
of the OIC and also furthering a campaign to add religion, especially Islamophobia, 
to the racism agenda at the Durban review conference);107 and thirdly, the somewhat 
cryptic “negative effects of unilateral coercive measures,”108 (which was introduced by 
Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement).109 I have explained above Canada’s 
opposition with respect to the Durban review conference held in April 2009. As for 
the “defamation of religions” effort, the problem here is that such resolutions represent 
a move away from the traditional understanding of human rights as protections for 
individuals and a move towards the protection of concepts, ideas and ideology, with 
consequences for the protection of freedom of speech. Opponents to the “defamation 
of religions” project worry that this approach establishes “a right not to be offended” 
that could provide cover for states to suppress peaceful speech. It is also worth noting 
that the vote counts in 2008 and 2009 concerning this topic add support to Canada’s
106 Elaboration o f international complementary standards to the International Convention on 
the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination, Human Rights Council resolution 
6/21 of 28 September 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 
63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 35-37; From rhetoric to reality: a 
global call for concrete action against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance, Human Rights Council resolution 6/22 of 28 September 2007, reprinted in 
Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 
(2008) at 37-38; Preparations for the Durban Review Conference, Human Rights Council 
resolution 6/23 of 28 September 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, 
UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 39-40; Elaboration o f 
complementary standards to the International Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, Human Rights Council resolution 10/30 of 27 March 2009, reprinted 
in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 
April 2009) at 111-113.
107 Combating defamation o f religions, Human Rights Council resolution 4/9 of 30 March 2007, 
reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN 
Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 40-45, adopted by a vote of 24 to 14 (including Canada), with 9 
abstentions.
108 See Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, Human Rights Council resolution 6/7 of
28 September 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., 
Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 14-16 and Human rights and unilateral coercive 
measures, Human Rights Council resolution 9/4 of 24 September 2008, reprinted in Report 
o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, Addendum, UN Doc. 
A/63/53/Add.l (2008) at 8-10. See also Human rights and unilateral coercive measures, 
Human Rights Council decision 4/103 of 30 March 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human 
Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 46, which 
was also adopted by a divided vote.
109 The Non-Aligned Movement (or “NAM”) is a cross-regional grouping of 117 states originally 
unaligned to the West or the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
position, with the states voting no or abstaining now outnumbering those in support of 
the “defamation of religion” resolutions.110
As for the topic of “unilateral coercive measures,” the focus here is on actions 
allegedly taken by (mostly developed) states to obtain the alleged subordination of 
(mostly developing) states, including measures of an extraterritorial nature and actions 
taken by one state resulting in economic pressures on another state or states. This 
is a controversial topic of historical division, dating back to the first United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in 1964, which in turn led to 
the birth of the bloc known as the “Group of 77” and its goal of gaining greater leverage 
for developing states within multilateral fora.111 During UNCTAD I, many developed 
nations had felt compelled to vote no or abstain, but the efforts of UNCTAD I and a 
working group that it created eventually led to the adoption of a proposed “Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States” by an overwhelming vote of developing states 
at the General Assembly in 1974.112 Article 32 of this declaratory Charter provides 
that: “No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type 
of measure to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the 
exercise of its sovereign rights,”113 thus solidifying the topic of “unilateral coercive 
measures” as a subject matter for further attention. Ironically, however, after the 
adoption (by a divided vote) of the Council’s most recent resolution on “Human rights 
and unilateral coercive measures,”114 which tasked the UN Secretary-General with
110 See Combating defamation o f religions, Human Rights Council resolution 7/19 of 27 March
2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, 
UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 126-129, adopted by a vote of 21 to 10 (including Canada), with
14 abstentions; Combating defamation o f religions, Human Rights Council resolution 10/22 
of 26 March 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council at its Tenth Session, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 81-86, adopted by a vote of 23 to 11 (including 
Canada), with 13 abstentions.
111 As acknowledged in the Group of 77’s own website at: <http://www.g77.org/doc/>. The 
Group of 77 now has 130 members, all of which are developing states.
112 See Charter o f Economic Rights and Duties o f States, General Assembly resolution 3281 
(XXIX) of 12 December 1974, UN Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (1974), (1975) 14 I.L.M. 251, 
adopted by a vote of 120 to 6, with 10 abstentions (including Canada) (as noted in S.K. 
Chatteijee, “The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: An Evaluation After 15 
Years” (1991) 40 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 669 at 672). Soon after its adoption, the Charter was 
invoked by Libya as justification for its nationalization of foreign owned property without 
compensation, leading Professor René-Jean Dupry of the University of Nice to conclude 
in a 1977 arbitral award that “the conditions under which ... [the Charter] ... was adopted 
show unambiguously that there was no general consensus of the States with respect to the 
most important provisions.” Dupuy also identified the Charter as one of several resolutions 
“supported by a majority of states but not by any of the developed countries with market 
economies which carry on the largest part of international trade”: Texaco Overseas Petroleum 
Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, translated and reprinted in (1978) 17 I.L.M. 1 at 29-30, (1979)
53 I.L.R. 389 at 489 and 491.
113 An express link to article 32 is made in paragraph 6 of HRC Res. 6/7, supra note 107.
114 HRC Res. 9/4, supra note 107.
seeking the views and information of member-states on the implication and negative 
effects of unilateral coercive measures on their populations, only five states felt the 
need to respond.115
Unilateral coercive measures are also viewed by developing states as a 
significant barrier to the implementation of the “right to development;”116 another third 
generation human right of an economic nature held in high regard by developing states. 
As with other new human rights, the recognition of this right has been fostered by the 
adoption of a General Assembly resolution containing a declaratory text, although 
the Declaration on the Right to Development117 was not adopted by consensus, but 
by a recorded vote revealing 146 states in favour, 1 against (the United States), and
8 abstentions (Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Israel, 
Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).118 As Australian diplomat Roland Rich 
has written, in an essay collection edited by Professor James Crawford, then of the 
University of Sydney: “The absence of consensus raises questions about the authority 
in which the Declaration should be h  Id,”119 especially when the world’s largest donor, 
in monetary terms, felt compelled to vote against this declaration, and many of the 
abstaining states were significant aid donors. The main concern for these states, apart 
from the conceptual difficulty with recognizing collective human rights, is a fear that 
the provision of developmental assistance (from developed to developing state) will be 
seen as an obligation or legal duty under international law.120 It has also been argued 
historically by several states that issues of trade, monetary policy, and multilateral 
development assistance should be addressed within the bodies established for these 
purposes, such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the World Bank.
To complete the story, it must be noted that Canada also voted, in good 
company, against resolutions concerning the dissatisfaction of developing countries 
with the geographical balance of staff hired by the Office of the High Commissioner
115 Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures: Report o f the Secretary-General, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/30 (3 July 2009). Those five states were Belarus, Costa Rica, Iraq, Spain and 
Ukraine, with only Ukraine having been a member of the Council, although Ukraine had 
voted against the adoption of resolution 9/4.
116 See the ninth preambular paragraph of HRC Res. 6/7, supra note 107, to this effect.
117 Declaration on the Right to Development, GA Res. 41/128, UN GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No.
53 at 186-187, UN Doc. A/RES/41/128 (1986). On the emergence of the right to development, 
see Anne Orford, “Globalization and the Right to Development” in Peoples’ Rights, supra 
note 90 at 129-135.
118 UN GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/41/PV.97 (4 December 1986).
119 Rich, supra note 90 at 52.
120 After all, Hohfeldian theory has long posited that with a right, there must be a correlative 
duty: Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1920) at 35-38.
of Human Rights,121 and on resolutions concerning the use of mercenaries and private 
military companies,122 and the human rights situation in Sri Lanka.123 On only five 
occasions during its three-year period of membership did Canada register a vote of 
abstention, albeit in good company on each occasion.124 However, a review of the 
official record also reveals that by the Council’s sixth session in the fall of 2007, 
WEOG states, along with their allies in the Eastern European group, were tactically 
“fighting back” by promoting resolution texts on topics of interest to all members,
121 Composition o f the staff o f the Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Human Rights Council resolution 7/2 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the 
Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 
82-84; Composition o f the staff o f the Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for  
Human Rights, Human Rights Council resolution 10/5 of 26 March 2009, reprinted in Report 
o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at
19-22.
122 Mandate o f the Working Group on the use o f mercenaries as a means o f violating human 
rights and impeding the exercise o f the right o f peoples to self-determination, Human 
Rights Council resolution 7/21 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights 
Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 132-134; The 
use o f mercenaries as a means o f violating human rights and impeding the exercise o f the 
right o f peoples to self-determination, Human Rights Council resolution 10/11 of 26 March
2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/ 
HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 37-42.
123 Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection o f human rights, Human Rights 
Council resolution S-l 1/1 of 27 May 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council 
on its Eleventh Special Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-11/2 (2 June 2009) at 3-7.
124 Strengthening o f the Office o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Human Rights Council resolution 4/6 of 30 March 2007, reprinted in Report o f the Human 
Rights Council, UN GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/62/53 (2007) at 36-40; From 
rhetoric to reality: a global call for concrete action against racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, Human Rights Council resolution 7/33 of 28 March
2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, 
UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 166-167; Mandate o f the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection o f the right to freedom o f opinion and expression, Human Rights Council 
resolution 7/36 of 28 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN 
GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 173-176; The impact o f the 
global economic andfinancial crises on the universal realization and effective enjoyment o f 
human rights, Human Rights Council resolution S-l0/1 of 23 February 2009, reprinted in 
Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Special Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-10/2 
(30 March 2009) at 3-6; Situation o f human rights in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo 
and the strengthening o f technical cooperation and consultative services, Human Rights 
Council resolution 10/33 of 27 March 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council 
on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 116-119. On the latter, the 
focus on technical assistance was likely the difficulty since it must be noted that a resolution 
concerning the serious human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
had been adopted without a vote three months prior: see Situation o f human rights in the 
east o f the Democratic Republic o f the Congo, Human Rights Council resolution S-8/1 of 
1 December 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Eighth Special 
Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/S-8/2 (16 January 2009) at 3-5.
(such as discrimination on the basis of religion and belief), with the voting records 
suggesting that the language of these texts reflected a more balanced approach than 
those that had been previously promoted.125 This group also secured the adoption of 
resolution texts on the issues of good governance and anti-corruption,126 topics for 
which a “no” vote by an African or Asian state should create some embarrassment, as 
well as resolution texts on the human rights situation in North Korea127 and (by a close 
vote) Sudan128 and on medical ethics and humane treatment.129 Through these efforts, 
Canada was able to register a recorded “yes” vote in good company for the adoption 
of seven resolutions and one decision130 among the 55 resolutions and seven decisions 
adopted by a recorded vote during Canada’s three-year term on the Council. This tally 
also includes seven of the eleven resolutions adopted at the eleven special sessions 
held from 2006-2009 to address urgent situations of human rights, notwithstanding the 
hope expressed in the institution-building package that the texts of such resolutions be 
drafted “with a view to achieving the widest participation in their consideration and, if 
possible, achieving consensus on them.”131
125 See Elimination o f all forms o f intolerance and o f discrimination based on religion or belief, 
Human Rights Council resolution 6/37 of 14 December 2007, reprinted in Report o f the 
Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 
69-74 (adopted by a vote of 29 to 0, with 18 abstentions), and HRC Res. 10/25, supra note 
83.
126 The role o f good governance in the promotion and protection o f human rights, Human Rights 
Council resolution 7/11 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council, 
UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 (2008) at 103-105, adopted by a vote 
of 41 to 0, with 6 abstentions.
127 Although, on the first foray, the combined total of the opposing and abstaining states 
outweighed the votes in favour. See Situation o f human rights in the Democratic People s 
Republic o f Korea, Human Rights Council resolution 7/15 of 27 March 2008, reprinted in 
Report o f the Human Rights Council, UN GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 53, UN Doc. A/63/53 
(2008) at 118-119, adopted by a vote of 22 to 7, with 18 abstentions; Situation o f human 
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea, Human Rights Council resolution 
10/16 of 26 March 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth 
Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 64-67, adopted by a vote of 26 to 6, with
15 abstentions.
128 Situation o f human rights in Sudan, Human Rights Council resolution 11/10 of 18 June
2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council at its Eleventh Session, UN Doc. AI 
HRC/11/37 (29 June 2009) at 72-76, adopted by a vote of 20 (including Canada) to 18, with
9 abstentions.
129 Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: the role and 
responsibility o f medical and other health personnel, Human Rights Council resolution 
10/24 of 27 March 2009, reprinted in Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth 
Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 2009) at 90-94, adopted by a vote of 34 to 0, with
13 abstentions.
130 Publication o f reports completed by the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection 
o f Human Rights, Human Rights Council decision 10/117 of 27 March 2009, reprinted in 
Report o f the Human Rights Council on its Tenth Session, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/29 (20 April 
2009) at 128, adopted by a vote of 29 to 3, with 15 abstentions.
131 HRC Res. 5/1, supra note 42 at para. 127.
V. THE EVENTUAL FATE OF THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
As for the Indigenous Rights Declaration, the disagreement concerning this text that 
was evident at the Council’s first meeting in June 2006 did not assuage concerns 
within the larger 192-member General Assembly, which subsequently voted in 
December 2006 “to defer consideration of and action” on the draft text to allow for 
further consultations,132 and ultimately amended the Council’s recommended text. 
A comparison of the declaration text as promoted by the Council in 2006 with that 
adopted by the Assembly in 2007133 reveals notable revisions to articles 3 and 46 to 
emphasize the intended non-impairment of the territorial integrity and political unity 
of sovereign and independent states, and thus address concerns about the extension of 
self-determination rights to indigenous peoples.134 Additional text was also added to 
the declaration’s preamble concerning this desired respect for the territorial integrity 
and political unity of sovereign states,135 while also requiring respect for regional 
variations as well as national, historical and cultural particularities.136 Several 
grammatical tweaks were also made to the preamble and to several articles.
The altered text was eventually adopted as the Indigenous Rights Declaration 
in the final days of the 61st annual session of the General Assembly in September 2007,
132 See Working group o f the Commission on Human Rights to elaborate a draft declaration in 
accordance with paragraph 5 o f the General Assembly resolution 49/214 o f 23 December 
1994, GA Res. 61/178, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. 1) at 417-424, UN Doc. AI 
RES/61/178 (2006) at para. 2, adopted by a recorded vote of 85 (including Canada) to none, 
with 89 abstentions.
133 The declaration text is found in the annex to United Nations Declaration on the Rights o f 
Indigenous Peoples, GA Res. 61/295, UN GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49 (vol. Ill) at 15-25, 
UN Doc. A/RES/61/295 (2007) [GARes. 61/295].
134 These concerns were so strongly felt by African states that the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights felt the need to issue a non-binding “Advisory opinion on the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” in May 2007 in an attempt to 
reassure them. The Advisory Opinion is available online at: <http://www.achpr.org/english/ 
Special%20Mechanisms/Indegenous/Advisory%20opinion_eng.pdf>.
135 Those unfamiliar with the subtleties of international human rights developments may 
overlook the importance of the reference now found in the sixteenth preambular paragraph 
of the declaration to the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme o f Action, UN Doc. A1 
CONF. 157/23 (1993), with paragraph 2 of this declaration making it clear that the right of 
self-determination “shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which 
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.”
136 Paragraph 23 of the declaration’s preamble reads: “Recognizing also that the situation of 
indigenous peoples varies from region to region and from country to country and that the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various historical and cultural 
backgrounds should be taken into consideration.”
but again without the all-important consensus that gives strength and moral force 
to these kinds of non-binding political texts.137 Canada, along with Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States - all four being highly developed democratic regimes 
with significant indigenous populations - voted against the declaration’s adoption,138 
with Canada stating for the record that it continued to have:
... significant concerns with respect to the wording of the current text, 
including the provisions on lands, territories and resources; on free, prior 
and informed consent when used as a veto; on self government without 
recognition of the importance of negotiations; on intellectual property; on 
military issues; and on the need to achieve an appropriate balance between 
the rights and obligations of indigenous peoples, Member States and third 
parties.139
Note that Canada did not mention the right of self-determination, which 
is understandable given Canada’s public acknowledgement of the right’s evolving 
extension to indigenous peoples.140 Canada did, however, emphasize its “understanding 
that this Declaration is not a legally binding instrument” and also concluded that: “It has 
no legal effect in Canada, and its provisions do not represent customary international 
law.”141 Similar understandings were expressed by Australia, New Zealand and 
Colombia, with the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Guyana and Suriname also stating
137 GA Res. 61/295, supra note 132, was adopted by a recorded vote of 143 votes to 4, with 11 
abstentions: UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (13 September
2007) at 18-19.
138 The texts of their explanations of vote, as well as the explanations of position and expressions 
of reservation provided by other states, can be found in UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th Plen. 
Mtg., UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (13 September 2007) at 11-27. In April 2009, Australia 
announced that it had reversed its position and now endorsed the declaration, in keeping 
with a promise made during the November 2007 election which had resulted in a change 
of government: “Australia backs U.N. on indigenous rights” The Age (Melbourne) (3 April 
2009).
139 Statement of Ambassador John McNee (Canada) recorded in the verbatim record of the 107th 
plenary meeting of the Assembly’s 61st session held on 13 September 2007: UN GAOR, 61st 
Sess., 107th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (13 September 2007) at 12-13.
140 See Canada’s response to a request for such information posed by the Human Rights 
Committee in July 2005 (UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/L/CAN), during the Committee’s 
consideration of Canada’s fifth periodic report made pursuant to its reporting obligations 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), supra note 33. 
The response has been made available to the public via the website of the Department of 
Canadian Heritage online at: <http://pch.gc.ca/pgm/pdp-hrp/docs/reponses-responses/101- 
eng.cfm> (unfortunately without a date, but this statement was likely provided to the 
Committee in October 2005). Note that the Human Rights Committee is a treaty monitoring 
body established by article 28 of its constitutive treaty, the ICCPR, consisting of independent 
experts. It is not the same body as the former Commission on Human Rights, nor the Human 
Rights Council.
141 UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (13 September 2007) at 13.
clearly that the Declaration is a political document and not a legally binding text.142
I mention these matters since members of the bar have a professional and ethical 
obligation to avoid misleading a court (and by extension other interested persons) by 
omitting reference to the voting record and official explanations of vote and position 
(known “in the trade” as “EOVs” and “EOPs”) relating to the adoption of a resolution 
text. Unfortunately, it is too often the case, that the political output of the UN is cited 
to a Canadian court as if  a source of international law.
It is also interesting to note, given my earlier discussion of collective human 
rights, that Japan used its explanation of position to state for the record that: “While the 
Declaration stipulates that some rights are collective rights, it seems that the concept 
of collective human rights is not widely recognized as a well-established concept 
in general international law, and most States do not accept it.”143 This position was 
echoed by the United Kingdom, which stated for the record that:
With the exception of the right to self-determination, we therefore do not 
accept the concept of collective human rights in international law. Of 
course, certain individual human rights can often be exercised collectively, 
in community with others. Examples would include freedom of association, 
freedom of religion or a collective title to property. That remains a long­
standing and well-established position of my Government. It is one we 
consider to be important in ensuring that individuals within groups are not 
left vulnerable or unprotected by allowing rights of the groups to supersede 
the human rights of the individual.144
Others expressed their reservations in more nuanced and qualified terms, 
with Sweden stating that: “The Swedish Government has no difficulty in recognizing 
collective rights outside the framework of human rights law. However, it is the 
firm opinion of the Swedish Government that individual human rights prevail over 
the collective rights mentioned in the Declaration.”145 All three states voted for the 
Declaration’s adoption, but they made these statements to express their reservations 
on instructions from their capitals presumably in hope that their successors, and any 
future users of the declaration text, would check the official record concerning its 
adoption.
These events also illustrate why judicial citations to earlier draft versions 
of political texts adopted by international bodies should be considered unwise or 
imprudent. An earlier draft of the proposed Indigenous Rights Declaration was indeed 
cited by one member of Canada’s highest court, with the concurrence of another, in
142 Ibid. at 12 (Australia), 14 (New Zealand), 17 (Columbia), 22 (United Kingdom), 22 
(Bangladesh), 26 (Guyana) and 27 (Suriname).
143 Ibid. at 20 (Japan).
144 Ibid. at 21 (United Kingdom).
145 Ibid. at 24 (Sweden).
Mitchell v. M.N.R., some six years prior to the Declaration’s finalization.146 The draft 
at that time had been written by a sub-group of professors and experts as a proposal 
to states, and the specific provision cited by the judges has since undergone revision 
(and expansion).147 Judicial citations to draft declarations, much like citations to draft 
statutes, can cause consternation among members of the bar, who rightly wonder about 
the message sent regarding the required extent of their legal research efforts (and the 
consequential impacts on the costs of legal services). For many a government lawyer, 
well-meaning but cautious by nature, who is tasked with giving advice to their client 
on the use, if any, by a Canadian court of a UN declaratory text, the Mitchell citation 
to a draft version, let alone a finalized declaration, may well have had a chilling effect. 
It certainly provides no comfort to a government lawyer tasked with providing a risk 
assessment, notwithstanding the accepted fact that the General Assembly is not a 
legislature and a declaration is not a recognized source of law. Canada’s “citation 
incident” in Mitchell was also a factor not faced by other states that were confident that 
their domestic courts would recognize that declarations are statements of aspiration 
and political commitment, and thus faced no risk that the declaration would be used 
by domestic courts to interpret, alter or influence domestic law, even from a contextual 
perspective.148
146 Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at para. 81 per Binnie J. with the concurrence of 
Major J.
147 The specific provision cited in Mitchell (ibid.) at para. 81, then numbered as article 35, 
provided that: “Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders, 
have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including 
activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with other peoples 
across borders.” The final text of what became article 36(1) of the declaration, as found in 
GA Res. 61/295, supra note 135, provides that: “Indigenous peoples, in particular those 
divided by international borders, have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations 
and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social 
purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders” [emphasis 
added]. Article 36(2) further provides that: □ States, in consultation and cooperation with 
indigenous peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the 
implementation of this right.”
148 Sadly, the Ontario Court of Appeal has demonstrated the risk of confusion in Canada, 
referring to the declaration as “a convention, which Canada voted against and has not 
ratified” (even though the declaration is clearly not a convention and cannot be ratified ), but 
then after recognizing that “international law often is of assistance in the interpretation of 
domestic legal and constitutional norms,” the Court holds that the general language of this 
political text does not “provide any meaningful assistance to the resolution of the specific 
issue of Canadian constitutional law presented:” Mississaugas o f Scugog Island First Nation 
v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union o f Canada 
(CAW-Canada), [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 71 at para. 46 (Ont. C.A). Such contortions could have 
been avoided if the court had simply recognized that the declaration is not a source of law, 
but a source of policy and aspiration, adopted by a political organ of the UN to guide the 
actions of those states that voted in favour.
Subsequent events, however, have suggested that a state’s vote in favour of 
a declaration within the General Assembly can encourage some domestic courts to 
cite the text, depending on that court’s willingness (or unwillingness) to distinguish 
between international law and policy, as illustrated by the judicial citation to the 
Indigenous Rights Declaration in a significant Mayan land rights ruling released by 
the Supreme Court of Belize only a month after the declaration’s adoption.149 In this 
judgment, Belize’s Chief Justice Abdulai Conteh (a former Sierra Leonean politician 
with international ambitions)150 writes:
Also, importantly in this regard is the recent Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 13 September 2007. Of course, unlike resolutions of the 
Security Council, General Assembly resolutions are not ordinarily binding 
on member states. But where these resolutions or Declarations contain 
principles of general international law, states are not expected to disregard 
them. This Declaration -  G A Res 61/295, was adopted by an overwhelming 
number of 143 states in favour with only four States against with eleven 
abstentions. It is o f some signal importance, in my view, that Belize voted in 
favour o f this Declaration.151
The Chief Justice then goes on to cite the very provision of the declaration 
causing the greatest consternation among states, namely article 26 on lands, territories 
and resources, describing this provision as being “of especial resonance and relevance 
in the context of this case, reflecting, as I think it does, the growing consensus and 
the general principles of international law on indigenous peoples and their lands
149 See Cal et al v. Attorney-General of Belize and Minister ofNatural Resources and Environment; 
Coy et al v. Attorney-General of Belize and Minister ofNatural Resources and Environment, 
Judgment of 17 October 2007, Claims Nos. 171 and 172 of 2007 (Supreme Court of Belize), 
available through the University of Arizona College of Law, online at: <http://www.law. 
arizona.edu/depts/iplp/advocacy/maya_belize/documents/ClaimsNos 171 and 172of2007. 
pdf>.
150 Conteh is a former Member of Parliament, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, 
Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, First Vice-President and Minister of Rural 
Development of the Republic of Sierra Leone. He was part of the Siaka Stevens government 
(1971-1985), which was criticized for corruption, dictatorial methods, and the deaths of 
political opponents, and served as Attorney General and Minister of Justice during the treason 
trials of the late 1980s concerning a failed coup against Stevens’ successor. Conteh later 
fled Sierra Leone and unsuccessfully sought asylum in Britain: Michael Durham, “African 
leader’s asylum plea fails” The Independent (31 July 1992) n.p.; “Conteh to go; Abdulai 
Conteh” The Times (London) (25 July 1992) 3. He later settled in The Gambia, but after 
conflict with the Yahyah Jammeh government, he went to live in exile in the United States. 
He has served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Belize since 2000. Information on 
his background and career highlights can be found circulating on African websites as a result 
of his unsuccessful campaign for the chairmanship of the Commission of the African Union 
in early 2008.
151 Cal v. Attorney-General o f Belize, supra note 148 at para. 131 [emphasis added].
and resources,”152 but citing no authority to support this conclusion.153 Chief Justice 
Conteh then concludes by stating: “I am therefore, of the view that this Declaration, 
embodying as it does, general principles of international law relating to indigenous 
peoples and their lands and resources, is of such force that the defendants, representing 
the Government of Belize, will not disregard it. Belize, it should be remembered, 
votedfor it.”154
These statements help explain why University of Arizona law professor S. 
James Anaya, who assisted with the Belize case and currently serves as the Human 
Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, has stated that “this seminal judgment constitutes the 
most far reaching application of international law by a domestic court to recognize 
the rights of indigenous groups to their traditional lands and resources.”155 Ironically, 
this “far reaching” judgment also helps explain why, with hindsight, four common 
law countries with democratic regimes and significant indigenous populations may 
have felt compelled to vote against the Declaration (although given the debate raging 
within the United States concerning judicial citation to foreign and international law 
sources,156 we are unlikely to see a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court cite a mere 
declaration). But if a trend develops of domestic judges citing UN resolutions in 
lawsuits brought against governments in domestic courts, whether or not with 
reference to voting records, statements of understanding and explanations of vote, 
more governments will feel the need to subject the annual onslaught of UN resolutions
152 Ibid.
153 For evidence of state concern and opposition to article 26, one can refer to the explanations 
of vote and explanations of position delivered by state representatives on the day of the 
declaration’s adoption: UN GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc. A/61/PV.107 (13 
September 2007). With respect to opposition to article 26, note the statements of Australia (at
11 ), Canada (at 12-13), New Zealand (at 14) and the United States (at 15), and with respect to 
concerns, note the clarifications provided by Norway (at 22), Mexico (at 23), Sweden (at 25), 
and Thailand (at 25). Such statements indicate the absence of actual state practice to support 
the conclusion that a rule of law exists.
154 Cal v. Attorney-General o f Belize, supra note 148 at para. 132 [emphasis added].
155 See the University of Arizona College of Law, online at: <http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/ 
iplp/advocacy/maya_belize/index.cfm?page=advoc>. Professor Anaya is the James J. Lenoir 
Professor of Human Rights Law and Policy at the Rogers College of Law at the University of 
Arizona, and actively involved in several prominent indigenous rights cases, brought against 
states, through his direction of a legal clinical program for students and affiliated attorneys. 
He is also a widely-respected scholar on international indigenous rights: see, for example, S. 
James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).
156 See further James Allan & Grant Huscroft, “Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? 
Rights Internationalism in American Courts” (2006) 43 San Diego L. Rev. 1.
to greater legal scrutiny and an intense “legal scrub.”157 As one who trains law 
students interested in international law careers, perhaps I should endorse such a trend 
as a job-creation technique, but I fear that over-lawyering the annual proceedings of 
an international organ such as the UN General Assembly overlooks the cooperation 
to be achieved from a diplomatic perspective through the use of looser language and 
intentional vagaries within international texts that are designed to engender consensus, 
widen the tent, or simply “save face.”
CONCLUSIONS
The UN Human Rights Council remains a new institution, and conclusions about 
its future prospects at this time are by necessity premature. Nevertheless, one can 
note that having spent much of its first year attempting to reach a consensus with 
respect to the Council’s functions and future priorities, the Council remains guided 
by an “institution-building package” that was eventually adopted over the objections 
of several states, including Australia, Canada, Israel and the United States. It also 
appears from this review of the Council’s substantive activities for its first three years 
that the goal to create a new, reinvigorated and objectively-principled body distinct 
from the former Commission remains unmet, although it must be remembered that the 
General Assembly resolution providing for the Council’s creation also provides for a 
five-year review to take place in 2011.158 In preparation for this review, assessments 
of the Council’s activities in its formative years are both useful and timely, with this 
particular assessment seeking to provide an additional perspective by combining a 
review of the Council’s activities with a parallel review of Canada’s experience as 
a Council member from 2006-2009 in light of Canada’s role as the great dissenter 
throughout this period.
It is true that much of the discussion within the popular media and among non­
governmental organizations concerning Canada’s activities within the Council have 
focused on Canada’s opposition to a tranche of resolutions focused on Israeli actions 
in the occupied territories in the Middle East. These resolutions have been sponsored 
by state members of the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
who have worked with the benefits offered by bloc politics to focus on Israel at a 
time when other serious human rights situations in the world were also deserving of 
Council attention. But this focus on Israel also deflects attention from a deeper and a 
seemingly unbridgeable divide between member states of the Council, and between 
developed and developing countries in general in various multilateral fora, concerning 
the very nature of human rights and the balance between individual rights and the 
rights of the collective, whether those rights be of an economic or religious nature.
157 Treaty texts are subjected to an intensive, line-by-line, legal “scrub” because they are 
intended to be legally binding, while resolutions are reviewed by lawyers guided by a legal
risk assessment that takes into account the fact that resolutions, including those containing 
declaratory texts in an annex, are non-binding political texts.
From this review of the official record for the Council’s activities for 2006-
2009, it appears that the underlying issue at stake is whether an intergovernmental 
body, such as the former Commission or the present Council, should focus its efforts 
on the bedding-down of the rights that we have, thus focusing on implementation, 
country-specific action and accountability for non-performance, or should the 
Council, now re-constituted to reflect the greater geopolitical weight of Asian and 
African states, continue with the standard-setting activities of the past by pushing 
for the development of new rights to address perceived gaps in a system viewed as 
over-focused on individual rights at the expense of rights of a collective nature? The 
continuing division of views on this underlying question can be seen reflected in the 
recorded vote tallies for the Council’s activities, with the voting pattern of 33 or 34 
votes to an opposing group of 11, 12 or 13 votes demonstrating the geopolitical realities 
at play within both the Council and likely the UN as a whole. Today, developing 
countries, supported by China and Russia, are able to use their numbers and cross- 
regional appeal to counter the weakening influence of European states159 and that of 
the “Others” in their attempt to focus global action on their priorities and objectives. 
A question for future research is whether the membership of the United States on the 
Council from 2009 on will make a differenceSome commentators have placed much 
emphasis on the Council being established as the premier human rights body within 
the UN, with some observers leaving the impression that this may be reason alone for 
Canadian engagement at the highest levels.160 However, one must never lose sight of 
the plain fact that the Council is not (to borrow the words of Professor Bossuyt) “a 
tribunal of impartial judges, not an academy of specialists in human rights, nor a club of 
human rights activists,”161 but rather a body of government representatives instructed
159 See further, Richard Gowan & Franziska Brantner, Global Force for Human Rights? 
An Audit o f European Power at the UN (London: European Council on Foreign Relations,
2008).
160 This view is reflected in the reports of Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on 
Human Rights, which views the Council as “the UN’s primary forum for cooperation on 
human rights issues” and has recommended the appointment of a Canadian ambassador on 
human rights to serve as a high-profile “bridge-builder”: Standing Senate Committee on 
Human Rights, Canada and the United Nations Human Rights Council: At the Crossroads: 
Interim Report (Chair: Raynell Andreychuk) (May 2007) at 12 and 51, repeated in A Time 
for Serious Evaluation, supra note 82 at 2,21 and 38. However, on building bridges, Gowan
& Brantner point out that “trying to be all things to all men rarely proves to be a successful 
strategy” {ibid. at 7) and efforts at “bridging” risks reduces the bridge-builder “to amiable 
impotence, emphasizing consensus over substance -  and courting irrelevance” {ibid. at 55), 
especially when the two opposing sides decide to marginalize the bridge-builder and deal 
directly with each other’s demands in negotiations. It has also been noted that EU countries 
are working hard to cultivate cross-regional relationships, but “for some, this is a sign of 
weakness, a reaction by western countries to a weakening of their position in the Council”: 
Allehone Mulugeta Abebe, “Of Shaming and Bargaining: African States and the Universal 
Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council” (2009) 9:1 Hum. Rts L. Rev.
1 at 21.
by capitals that “makes recommendations” and “serves as a forum for dialogue.”162 It 
is also likely to remain a political body controlled by states with very different political 
agendas, thus making hopes for consensus and universality on contentious matters 
impossible, particularly as polarization between “the West and the Rest” sets in. The 
Council is a body mandated to promote the protection of human rights, but one should 
not oversell this role at the expense of recognizing its innate institutional inabilities 
to serve as a credible and coherent voice for holding all states accountable for the 
domestic enforcement of internationally-agreed minimum standards.
As for the legal dimension and the message to be shared with lawyers and 
judges, it should be clear from this review of the Council’s and Canada’s activities 
for 2006-2009 that caution needs to be exercised before placing unbridled reliance 
on the various end-products of a UN body. Such caution is demonstrated when 
lawyers check the voting records, the explanations of position provided by state 
representatives, and the wider context in which the matter arose, as well as any 
relevant historical antecedents, before making reference to a UN resolution as if all 
UN output was a source of international legal obligation or even evidence of world 
opinion. International law is a discipline that, like others, has rules to ensure rigour, 
with these rules evidencing a need for a distinction to be drawn between a source of 
legal obligation and a source of policy development and political commitment. Neither 
the General Assembly nor the Human Rights Council serve as law-making bodies, 
and neither is mandated by Canada’s domestic constitutional order to make law for 
Canada. Legal and judicial citation to either the Council’s or the Assembly’s output, 
should therefore evoke caution and demands for further analysis, whether this output 
be in the form of resolutions, decisions, statements, or declarations, with arguments 
that the contents of a declaratory text represent rules of customary international law 
requiring more than simply the circular citation to that declaratory text. Evidence of 
state practice remains necessary within an international legal system still dominated 
by states, notwithstanding the influence of non-governmental forces on the making of 
international law and policy.
